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The rational expectations hypothesis swept through macroeconomics dur-
ing the 1970’s and permanently altered the landscape. It remains the prevail-
ing paradigm in macroeconomics, and rational expectations is routinely used
as the standard solution concept in both theoretical and applied macroeco-
nomic modelling. The rational expectations hypothesis was initially formu-
lated by John F. Muth Jr. in the early 1960s. Together with Robert Lucas
Jr., Thomas (Tom) Sargent pioneered the rational expectations revolution in
macroeconomics in the 1970s.
Possibly Sargent’s most important work in the early 1970’s focused on
the implications of rational expectations for empirical and econometric re-
search. His short 1971 paper “A Note on the Accelerationist Controversy”
provided a dramatic illustration of the implications of rational expectations
by demonstrating that the standard econometric test of the natural rate hy-
pothesis was invalid. This work was followed in short order by key papers that
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showed how to conduct valid tests of central macroeconomic relationships un-
der the rational expectations hypothesis. Imposing rational expectations led
to new forms of restrictions, called “cross-equation restrictions,” which in
turn required the development of new econometric techniques for the study
of macroeconomic relations and models.
Tom’s contributions were wide ranging. His early econometric work in the
1970s includes studies of the natural rate of unemployment, the neutrality of
real interest rates with respect to money, dynamic labor demand, empirics
of hyperinflation, and tests for the neutrality of money in “classical” rational
expectations models. In the 1980s Sargent (with Lars Hansen) developed
new econometric methods for estimating rational expectations models.
In addition to these seminal contributions to rational expectations econo-
metrics, Sargent made several key contributions during this period to theo-
retical macroeconomics, including the saddle path stability characterization
of the rational expectations equilibrium and the policy ineﬀectiveness propo-
sition (both developed with Neil Wallace), and the observational equivalence
of rational and non-rational theories of monetary neutrality. In later work
Tom continued to extend the rational expectations equilibrium paradigm into
new areas. Two prominent examples are the implications of the government
budget constraint for inflation and “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” (with
Neil Wallace) and the sources of the European unemployment problem (with
Lars Ljungqvist).
Tom’s impact on macroeconomics in the early days of rational expecta-
tions extends well beyond this research. His 1979 textbook Macroeconomic
Theory introduced a generation of graduate students around the world to a
new vision of macroeconomics in which time series analysis is fully integrated
into macro theory, and in which macroeconomic equilibrium is viewed as a
stochastic process.
Sargent’s contributions have not been confined to the development and
application of the rational expectations paradigm. As a true scholar he be-
came interested in the theoretical foundations of rationality. As he describes
below, the initial criticisms of the concept of rational expectations led him
in the 1980s to join a line of research called “learning theory,” in which the
theoretical underpinnings of rational expectations were examined.
Tom became one of the pioneers in this area as well. His 1989 papers
with Albert Marcet showed how to use the tools of stochastic approxima-
tion to analyze convergence of least squares learning to rational expectations
equilibrium in a general framework. His 1993 book Bounded Rationality in
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Macroeconomics helped to disseminate the learning approach to a broader
audience, and was part of the rapid growth of research on learning in the
1990s. Tom’s 1999 book The Conquest of American Inflation called atten-
tion to the possibility of “escape routes,” i.e. occasional large deviations from
an equilibrium, and led to a surge of interest in persistent learning dynam-
ics. Closely related to the research on learning are issues of robustness and
model misspecification to which Tom (with Lars Hansen) has recently made
key contributions.
The depth and range of the contributions we have listed is huge, yet this
is not the full extent. Sargent has also done important research in economic
history. His work in the 1980s on episodes of moderate and rapid inflations
and the recent research on monetary standards (with Francois Velde) is much
less technical, but the rational expectations viewpoint remains clearly visible
in these works.
Many collaborators, researchers and students have personally experienced
Tom’s remarkable intellectual depth and energy. His thinking is well reflected
in this interview, which has a somewhat unusual format. It gets to the key
issues very quickly. Only at the end is there commentary on some of his
personal experiences as a scholar.
Rational Expectations Econometrics
Evans and Honkapohja: How did you first get interested in rational
expectations?
Sargent: When I was a graduate student, estimating and interpreting
distributed lags topped the agenda of macroeconomists and other applied
economists. Because distributed lags are high dimensional objects, people
like Solow, Jorgenson, Griliches, Nerlove, and Almon sought economical ways
to parameterize those distributions in clever ways, for example, by using
ratios of low order polynomials in a lag operator. As beautiful as they are,
where on earth do those things come from? Cagan and Friedman interpreted
their adaptive expectations geometric distributed lag as measuring people’s
expectations. At Carnegie, Mike Lovell told me to read John Muth’s 1960
JASA paper. It rationalized Friedman’s adaptive expectations model for
permanent income by reverse engineering a stochastic process for income
for which Cagan’s expectation formula equals a mathematical expectation
of future values conditioned on the infinite history of past incomes. Muth’s
message was that the stochastic process being forecast should dictate both
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the distributed lag and the conditioning variables that people use to forecast
the future. The point about conditioning variables primed us to see the
importance of Granger-Wiener causality for macroeconomics.
Evans and Honkapohja: When did you first use rational expectations
to restrict a distributed lag or a vector autoregression in empirical work?
Sargent: In a 1971 paper on testing the natural unemployment rate
hypothesis. I figured out the pertinent cross-equation restrictions and showed
that in general they didn’t imply the ‘sum-of-the-weights’ test on distributed
lags that was being used to test the natural rate hypothesis. That was easy
because for that problem I could assume that inflation was exogenous and
use a univariate process for inflation. My 1973 and 1977 papers on rational
expectations and hyperinflation tackled a more diﬃcult problem. Those pa-
pers found the cross-equation restrictions on a VAR for money and prices by
reverse engineering a joint process for which Cagan’s adaptive expectations
formula delivers optimal forecasts. This was worth doing because Cagan’s
model fit the data so well. Imposing rational expectations exposed a lot
about the Granger causality structure between money and prices that pre-
vailed during most of the hyperinflations that Cagan had studied.
Evans and Honkapohja: Econometrically, what was the big deal
about rational expectations?
Sargent: Cross-equation restrictions and the disappearance of any free
parameters associated with expectations.
Evans and Honkapohja: What do you mean ‘disappearance’?
Sargent: In rational expectations models, people’s beliefs are among
the outcomes of our theorizing. They are not inputs.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you think that diﬀerences among peo-
ple’s models are important aspects of macroeconomic policy debates?
Sargent: The fact is that you simply cannot talk about those diﬀer-
ences within the typical rational expectations model. There is a communism
of models. All agents inside the model, the econometrician, and God share
the same model. The powerful and useful empirical implications of rational
expectations — the cross-equation restrictions and the legitimacy of the appeal
to a law of large number in GMM estimation — derive from that communism
of models.
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Evans and Honkapohja: What role do cross-equation restrictions
play in Lucas’s Critique?
Sargent: They are everything. The positive part of Lucas’s critique
was to urge applied macroeconomists and econometricians to develop ways to
implement those cross equation restrictions. His paper had three examples.
What transcends them is their cross-equation restrictions, and the absence of
free parameters describing expectations. In a nutshell, Lucas’s critique of pre-
rational expectations work was, “you have ignored cross equation restrictions,
and they are all important for policy evaluation.”
Evans and Honkapohja: What do those cross-equation restrictions
have to say about the evidence in favor of coeﬃcient volatility that Bob Lucas
talked about in the first part of his ‘Critique’?
Sargent: Little or nothing. Lucas used evidence of coeﬃcient drift and
add factors to bash the Keynesians, but as I read his paper, at least, he didn’t
claim to oﬀer an explanation for the observed drift. His three examples are
each time-invariant structures. Data from them would not have coeﬃcient
drift even if you fit one of those misspecified Keynesian models. So the
connection of the first part of his paper to the second was weak.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you feel that your work contributed to
the Lucas critique?
Sargent: It depends what you mean by ‘contribute’. Lucas attended
a conference on rational expectations at the University of Minnesota in the
spring of 1973. The day after the conference, I received a call from Pitts-
burgh. Bob had lost a manuscript and thought he might have left it at the
conference. I went to the room in Ford Hall at which we had held the con-
ference and found a folder with yellow sheets in it. I looked at the first few
pages. It was Bob’s Critique. I mailed the manuscript back to Bob. So, yes,
I contributed to the Critique.
Evans and Honkapohja: What were the profession’s most important
responses to the Lucas Critique?
Sargent: There were two. The first and most optimistic response
was complete rational expectations econometrics. A rational expectations
equilibrium is a likelihood function. Maximize it.
Evans and Honkapohja: Why optimistic?
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Sargent: You have to believe in your model to use the likelihood func-
tion. It provides a coherent way to estimate objects of interest (preferences,
technologies, information sets, measurement processes) within the context of
a trusted model.
Evans and Honkapohja: What was the second response?
Sargent: Various types of calibration. Calibration is less optimistic
about what your theory can accomplish because you’d only use it if you
didn’t fully trust your entire model, meaning that you think your model is
partly misspecified or incompletely specified, or if you trusted someone else’s
model and data set more than your own. My recollection is that Bob Lucas
and Ed Prescott were initially very enthusiastic about rational expectations
econometrics. After all, it simply involved imposing on ourselves the same
high standards we had criticized the Keynesians for failing to live up to. But
after about five years of doing likelihood ratio tests on rational expectations
models, I recall Bob Lucas and Ed Prescott both telling me that those tests
were rejecting too many good models. The idea of calibration is to ignore
some of the probabilistic implications of your model, but to retain others.
Somehow, calibration was intended as a balanced response to professing that
your model, though not correct, is still worthy as a vehicle for quantitative
policy analysis.
Evans and Honkapohja: Why do you say ‘various types of calibra-
tion’?
Sargent: Diﬀerent people mean and do diﬀerent things by calibra-
tion. Some people mean ‘use an extraneous estimator’. Take estimates from
some previous study and pretend that they are known numbers. An obvious
diﬃculty of this procedure is that often those extraneous estimates were pre-
pared with an econometric specification that contradicts your model. Treat-
ing those extraneous parameters as known ignores the clouds of uncertainty
around them, clouds associated with the estimation uncertainty conveyed
by the original researcher, and clouds from the ‘specification risk’ associ-
ated with putting your faith in the econometric specification that another
researcher used to prepare his estimates.
Other people, for example Larry Christiano and Marty Eichenbaum, by
calibration mean GMM estimates using a subset of the moment conditions
for the model and data set at hand. Presumably, they impose only a subset
of the moment conditions because they trust some aspects of their model
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more than others. This is a type of robustness argument that has been
pushed furthest by those now doing semiparametric GMM. There are ways
to calculate the standard errors to account for vaguely specified or distrusted
aspects of the model. By the way, these ways of computing standard errors
have a min-max flavor that reminds one of the robust control theory that
Lars Hansen and I are using.
Evans and Honkapohja: We know what question maximum likeli-
hood estimates answers, and the circumstances under which maximum like-
lihood estimates, or Bayesian counterparts to them, have good properties.
What question is calibration the answer to?
Sargent: The best answer I know is contained in work by Hansen and
others on GMM. They show the sense in which GMM is the best way to
estimate trusted features of a less than fully trusted model.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you think calibration in macroeconomics
was an advance?
Sargent: In many ways, yes. I view it as a constructive response to
Bob’s remark that ‘your likelihood ratio tests are rejecting too many good
models’. In those days, the rational expectations approach to macroeco-
nomics was still being challenged by influential people. There was a danger
that skeptics and opponents would misread those likelihood ratio tests as
rejections of an entire class of models, which of course they were not. (The
internal logic of the likelihood function as a complete model should have
made that clear, but apparently it wasn’t at the time!) The unstated case
for calibration was that it was a way to continue the process of acquiring
experience in matching rational expectations models to data by lowering our
standards relative to maximum likelihood, and emphasizing those features of
the data that our models could capture. Instead of trumpeting their failures
in terms of dismal likelihood ratio statistics, celebrate the features that they
could capture and focus attention on the next unexplained feature that ought
to be explained. One can argue that this was a sensible response to those
likelihood ratio tests. It was also a response to the scarcity of resources at
our disposal. Creating dynamic equilibrium macro theories and building a
time series econometrics suitable for estimating them were both big tasks.
It was a sensible opinion that the time had come to specialize and to use
a sequential plan of attack: let’s first devote resources to learning how to
create a range of compelling equilibrium models to incorporate interesting
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mechanisms. We’ll be careful about the estimation in later years when we
have mastered the modelling technology.
Evans and Honkapohja: Aren’t applications of likelihood based
methods in macroeconomics now making something of a comeback?
Sargent: Yes, because, of course, a rational expectations equilibrium
is a likelihood function, so you couldn’t ignore it forever. In the 1980s, there
were occasions when it made sense to say, ‘it is too diﬃcult to maximize the
likelihood function, and besides if we do, it will blow our model out of the
water.’ In the 2000s, there are fewer occasions when you can get by saying
this. First, computers have gotten much faster, and the Markov Chain Monte
Carlo algorithm, which can be viewed as a clever random search algorithm
for climbing a likelihood function, or building up a posterior, is now often
practical. Furthermore, a number of researchers have constructed rational
expectations models with enough shocks and wedges that they believe it is
appropriate to fit the data well with complete likelihood based procedures.
Examples are the recent models of Otrok and Smets and Wouters. By using
log-linear approximations, they can use the same recursive representation of
a Gaussian likelihood function that we were using in the late 1970s and early
80s.
Of course, for some nonlinear equilibrium models, it can be diﬃcult to
write down the likelihood. But there has been a lot of progress here thanks
to Tony Smith, Ron Gallant, and George Tauchen and others, who have
figured out ways to get estimates as good, or almost as good, as maximum
likelihood. I like the Gallant-Tauchen idea of using moment conditions from
the first-order conditions for maximizing the likelihood function of a well
fitting auxiliary model whose likelihood function is easy to write down.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you see any drawbacks to likelihood
based approaches for macro models?
Sargent: Yes. For one thing, without leaving the framework, it seems
diﬃcult to complete a self-contained analysis of sensitivity to key features of
a specification.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you think that these likelihood based
methods are going to sweep away GMM based methods that don’t use com-
plete likelihoods?
Sargent: No. GMM and other calibration strategies will have a big
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role to play whenever a researcher distrusts part of his specification and so
long as concerns about robustness endure.
Learning
Evans and Honkapohja: Why did you get interested in non-rational
learning theories in macroeconomics?
Sargent: Initially, to strengthen the case for and extend our under-
standing of rational expectations. In the 1970s, rational expectations was
severely criticized because, it was claimed, it endowed people with too much
knowledge about the economy. It was fun to be doing rational expectations
macro in the mid 70s because there was lots of skepticism, even hostility,
toward rational expectations. Critics claimed that an equilibrium concept
in which everyone shared ‘God’s model’ was incredible. To help meet that
criticism, I enlisted in Margaret Bray’s and David Kreps’s research program.
Their idea was to push agents’ beliefs away from a rational expectations equi-
librium, then endow them with learning algorithms and histories of data. Let
them adapt their behavior in a way that David Kreps later called ‘anticipated
utility’ behavior: here you optimize, taking your latest estimate of the transi-
tion equation as though it were permanent; update your transition equation;
optimize again; update again; and so on. (This is something like ‘fictitious
play’ in game theory. Kreps argues that while it is ‘irrational’, it can be a
smart way to proceed in contexts in which it is diﬃcult to figure out what it
means to be rational. Kreps’s Schwartz lecture has some fascinating games
that convince you that his anticipated utility view is attractive.) Margaret
Bray, Albert Marcet, Mike Woodford, you two, Xiaohong Chen and Hal
White, and the rest of us wanted to know whether such a system of adaptive
agents would converge to a rational expectations equilibrium. Together, we
discovered a broad set of conditions on the environment under which beliefs
converge. Something like a rational expectations equilibrium is the only pos-
sible limit point for a system with adaptive agents. Analogous results prevail
in evolutionary and adaptive theories of games.
Evans and Honkapohja: What do you mean ‘something like’?
Sargent: The limit point depends on how much prompting you give
agents in terms of functional forms and conditioning variables. The early
work in the least squares learning literature initially endowed agents with
wrong coeﬃcients, but with correct functional forms and correct condition-
ing variables. With those endowments, the systems typically converged to
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a rational expectations equilibrium. Subsequent work by you two, and by
Albert Marcet and me, withheld some pertinent conditioning variables from
agents, e.g., by prematurely truncating pertinent histories. We found conver-
gence to objects that could be thought of as ‘rational expectations equilibria
with people conditioning on restricted information sets’. Chen and White
studied situations in which agents permanently have wrong functional forms.
Their adaptive systems converge to a kind of equilibrium in which agents’
forecasts are optimal within the class of information filtrations that can be
supported by the functional forms to which they have restricted agents.
Evans and Honkapohja: How diﬀerent are these equilibria with
subtly misspecified expectations from rational expectations equilibria?
Sargent: They are like rational expectations equilibria in many ways.
They are like complete rational expectations equilibria in terms of many
of their operating characteristics. For example, they have their own set of
cross-equation restrictions that should guide policy analysis.
They are ‘self-confirming’ within the class of forecasting functions agents
are allowed. They can also be characterized as having forecasting functions
that are as close as possible to mathematical expectations conditioned on per-
tinent histories that are implied by the model, where proximity is measured
by a Kullback-Leibler measure of model discrepancy (that is, an expected
log likelihood ratio). If they are close enough in this sense, it means that it
could take a very long time for an agent living within one of these equilibria
to detect that his forecasting function could be improved.
However, suboptimal forecasting functions could not be sustained in the
limit if you were to endow agents with suﬃciently flexible functional forms,
e.g., the sieve estimation strategies like those studied by Xiaohong Chen.
Chen and White have an example in which a system with agents who have
the ability to fit flexible functional forms will converge to a nonlinear rational
expectations equilibrium.
Evans and Honkapohja: Were those who challenged the plausibility
of rational expectations equilibria right or wrong?
Sargent: It depends on how generous you want to be to them. We
know that if you endow agents with correct functional forms and condition-
ing variables, even then only some rational expectations equilibria are limit
points of adaptive economies. As you two have developed fully in your book,
other rational expectations equilibria are unstable under the learning dynam-
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ics and are eradicated under least squares learning. Maybe those unstable
rational expectations equilibria were the only ones the critics meant to ques-
tion, although this is being generous to them. In my opinion, some of the
equilibria that least squares learning eradicates deserved extermination: for
example, the ‘bad’ Laﬀer curve equilibria in models of hyperinflations that
Albert Marcet and I, and Stan Fischer and Michael Bruno also, found would
not be stable under various adaptive schemes. That finding is important for
designing fiscal policies to stabilize big inflations.
Evans and Honkapohja: Are stability results that dispose of some
rational expectations equilibria, and that retain others, the main useful out-
come of adaptive learning theory?
Sargent: They are among the useful results that learning theory
has contributed. But I think that the stability theorems have contributed
something even more important than equilibrium selection. If you stare at the
stability theorems, you see that learning theory has caused us to refine what
we mean by rational expectations equilibria. In addition to the equilibria
with ‘optimal misspecified beliefs’ that I mentioned a little while ago, it has
introduced a type of rational expectations equilibrium that enables us to
think about disputes involving diﬀerent models of the economy in ways that
we couldn’t before.
Evans and Honkapohja: What do you mean?
Sargent: Originally, we defined a rational expectations equilibrium in
terms of the ‘communism of models’ that I alluded to earlier. By ‘model’,
I mean a probability distribution over all of the inputs and outcomes of
the economic model at hand. Within such a rational expectations equilib-
rium, agents can have diﬀerent information, but they share the same model.
Learning theories in both macroeconomics and game theory have discovered
that the natural limit points of a variety of least-squares learning schemes
are what Kreps, Fudenberg, and Levine call ‘self-confirming equilibria’. In
a self-confirming equilibrium, agents can have diﬀerent models of the econ-
omy, but they must agree about events that occur suﬃciently often within
the equilibrium. That restriction leaves agents free to disagree about oﬀ-
equilibrium outcomes. The reason is that a law of large numbers doesn’t have
enough chances to act on such infrequent events. In the types of competi-
tive settings that we often use in macroeconomics, disagreement about oﬀ-
equilibrium-path outcomes among small private agents don’t matter. Those
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private agents need only to predict distributions of outcomes along an equi-
librium path. But the government is a large player. If it has the wrong model
about oﬀ-equilibrium-path outcomes, it can make wrong policy choices, sim-
ply because it is wrong about the counterfactual thought experiments that
go into solving a Ramsey problem, for example. No amount of empirical
evidence drawn from within a self-confirming equilibrium can convince a
government that it is wrong about its model, because its model is correct
for all frequently observed events. To be motivated to change its model, the
government must either experiment or listen to a new theorist. The theorist
has to come up with a model that is observationally equivalent with the gov-
ernment’s model for the old self confirming equilibrium outcomes, but that
improves the analysis of counterfactuals relative to those outcomes.
Evans and Honkapohja: Are there interesting examples of this kind
of thing occurring in the macroeconomy?
Sargent: You can tell a story that this is what Lucas was up to
with his 1972 JET paper on the natural rate. If you alter Kydland and
Prescott’s 1977 version of Lucas’s story a little, you can alter their timing
protocol and reinterpret Kydland and Prescott’s suboptimal time consistent
equilibrium as a self-confirming equilibrium that could be improved with a
better government model of oﬀ equilibrium path outcomes.
Evans and Honkapohja: Wasn’t this part of your story in The
Conquest of American Inflation?
Sargent: Yes.
Evans and Honkapohja: So it seems that you can talk about dis-
agreements among models within a rational expectations framework if you
extend the concept of rational expectations to mean ‘self-confirming’.
Sargent: Yes. This is a nice feature of self-confirming equilibrium
models. My reading of disputes about economic policy is that they are not
merely struggles based on diﬀerent information or diﬀerent interests — which
is all they could possibly reflect within a ‘communist’ rational expectations
model. Some disputes over government policy originate in the fact that
advocates have diﬀerent models of the way the economy functions, and it
can be diﬃcult to criticize their models on empirical grounds because they
fit the data from the prevailing equilibrium.
Evans and Honkapohja: What else has learning theory contributed?
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Sargent: A couple of important things. First, it contains some results
about rates of convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium that can be
informative about how diﬃcult it is to learn an equilibrium. Second, we have
discovered that even when convergence occurs with probability one, sample
paths can exhibit exotic trajectories called ‘escape routes’. These escape
routes exhibit long-lived departures from a self-confirming equilibrium and
can visit objects that qualify as ‘near equilibria’. The escape paths can be
characterized by an elegant control problem and contribute a form of ‘near
rational’ dynamics that can have amazing properties. I first encountered
these ideas while working on my Conquest book. In-Koo Cho and Noah
Williams have pushed these ideas further. I suspect that these escape routes
will prove to be a useful addition to our toolkit. For example, they can
sustain the kind of drifting parameters that Lucas brought out in the first
part of his Critique, but that, until recently, most of us have usually refrained
from interpreting as equilibrium outcomes. A good example of the type
of phenomena that drifting coeﬃcients with escapes from a self-confirming
equilibrium can explain is contained in the recent AER paper on recurrent
hyperinflations by Albert Marcet and Juan Pablo Nicolini.
Evans and Honkapohja: With your co-author Tim Cogley, you have
been studying drifting coeﬃcients and volatilities. Did Lucas’s Critique fuel
your work with Cogley?
Sargent: Yes. Sims claims that while there is ample evidence for
drifting volatilities, the evidence for drifting coeﬃcients is weak. And he
uses that fact to argue that U.S. data are consistent with time-invariant
government monetary and fiscal policy rules throughout the post WWII pe-
riod. So when bad macroeconomic outcomes occurred, it was due to bad
luck in the form of big shocks, not bad policy in the form of decision rules
that had drifted into becoming too accommodating or too tight. It is true
that detecting drifts in the AR coeﬃcients in a VAR is much more diﬃcult
than detecting drifts in innovation volatilities — this is clearest in contin-
uous time settings that finance people work in. (Lars Hansen has taught
this to me in the context of our work on robustness.) Thus, Sims and other
‘bad luck, not bad policy’ advocates say that the drift spotted by Lucas
is misinterpreted if it is regarded as indicating drifting decision rules, e.g.,
drifting monetary policy rules. The reason is that, by in eﬀect project-
ing in wrong directions, it misreads stochastic volatility as reflecting drift
in agents’ decision rules. These are obviously very important issues that
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can be sorted out only with an econometric framework that countenances
both drifting coeﬃcients and drifting volatilities. Tim and I are striving
to sort these things out, and so are Chris and Tao Zha and Fabio Canova.
Economic History
Evans and Honkapohja: Your papers on monetary history look very
diﬀerent than your other work. Why are there so few equations and so little
formal econometrics in your writings on economic history? Like your ‘Ends
of Four Big Inflations’ and your paper with Velde on features of the French
Revolution? We don’t mean to insult you, but you look more like an ‘old
economic historian’ than a ‘new economic historian’.
Sargent: This is a tough question. I view my eﬀorts in economic
history as pattern recognition, or pattern imposition, exercises. You learn
a suite of macroeconomic models that sharpen your mind by narrowing it.
The models alert you to look for certain items, e.g., ways that monetary
and fiscal policy are being coordinated. Then you read some history and
economic history and look at a bunch of error-ridden numbers. Data are
often error-ridden and incomplete. You read contemporaries who say diverse
things about what is going on, and historians who put their own spins on
things. From this disorder, you censor some observations, overweight others.
Somehow, you impose order and tell a story, cast in terms of the objects from
your suite of macroeconomic theories. Hopefully, the story rings true.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you find rational expectations models
useful for understanding history?
Sargent: Yes. A diﬃcult thing about history is that you are tempted to
evaluate historical actors’ decisions with too much hindsight. To understand
things, you somehow have to put yourself in the shoes of the historical actor
and reconstruct the information he had, the theory he was operating under,
and the interests he served. Accomplishing this is an immense task. But
our rational expectations theories and decision theories are good devices for
organizing our analysis. By the way, to mymind, reading history immediately
drives you away from perfect foresight models toward models in which people
face non-trivial forecasting problems under uncertainty.
Evans and Honkapohja: Interesting. But you didn’t answer our
question about why your historical work is more informal than your other
work.
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Sargent: I don’t know. Most of the historical problems that I have
worked on have involved episodes that can be regarded as transitions from
one rational expectations equilibrium to another. For example, the ends of
hyperinflations; the struggles for new monetary and fiscal policies presided
over by Poincare and Thatcher; the directed search for a new monetary
and fiscal constitution by a sequence of decision makers during the French
revolution; the eight hundred year co-evolution of theories and policies and
technologies for producing coins in our work with François on small change.
I saw contesting theories at play in all of these episodes. We didn’t see our
way clear to being as complete and coherent as you have to be in formal
work without tossing out much of the action. Analyzing the kinds of the
transitions that we studied in formal terms would have required a workable
model of the social process of using experience to induce new models, para-
digm shifts and revolutions of ideas, the really hard unsolved problem that
underlies Kreps’s anticipated utility program. (You wouldn’t be inspired to
take Muth’s brilliant leap to rational expectations models by running regres-
sions.) We didn’t know how to make such a model, but we nevertheless cast
our narratives in terms of a process that, with hindsight, induced new models
from failed experiences with old ones.
Robustness and Model Misspecification
Evans and Honkapohja: You work with Hansen and others on
robust control theory. How is that work related to your work on rational
expectations and on learning?
Sargent: It is connected to both, and to calibration as well. The idea
is to give a decision maker doubts about his model and ask him to make
good decisions when he fears that some other model might actually generate
the data.
Evans and Honkapohja: Why is that a good idea?
Sargent: One loose motivation for both rational expectations theory
and learning theories is that the economist’s model should have the property
that the econometrician cannot do better than the agents inside the model.
This criterion was used in the old days to criticize the practice of attribut-
ing to agents adaptive and other naive expectations schemes. So rational
expectations theorists endowed agents with the ability to form conditional
expectations, i.e., take averages with respect to infinite data samples drawn
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from within the equilibrium. The idea of learning theory was to take this
‘take averages’ idea seriously by giving agents data from outside the equilib-
rium, then to roll up your sleeves and study whether and at what rate agents
who take averages from finite outside-equilibrium data sets can eventually
learn what they needed to know in a population rational expectations equi-
librium. It turned out that they could. The spirit was to ‘make the agents
like econometricians’.
Of course, the typical rational expectations model reverses the situation:
the agent knows more than the econometrician. The agent inside the model
knows the parameters of the true model while the econometrician does not
and must estimate them. Further, thorough rational expectations econome-
tricians often come away from their analyses with a battery of specification
tests that have brutalized their models. (Recall my earlier reference to Bob’s
and Ed’s early 1980s comments to me that ’your likelihood ratio tests are
rejecting too many good models.’)
Using robust control theory is a way to let our agents share the experiences
of econometricians. The idea is to make the agent acknowledge and cope with
model misspecification.
Evans and Honkapohja: Is this just to make sure that agents are
put on the same footing as us in our role as econometricians?
Sargent: Yes. And an agent’s response to fear of model misspeci-
fication contributes behavioral responses that have interesting quantitative
implications. For example, fear of model misspecification contributes com-
ponents of indirect utility functions that in some types of data can look like
heightened risk aversion, but that are actually responses to very diﬀerent
types of hypothetical mental experiments than are Pratt measures of risk
aversion. For this reason, fear of model misspecification is a tool for under-
standing a variety of asset price spreads. Looked at from another viewpoint,
models of robust decision making contribute a disciplined theory of what
appears to be an endogenous preference shock.
Another reason is that decision making in the face of fear of model mis-
specification can be a useful normative tool for solving Ramsey problems.
That is why people at central banks are interested in the topic. They dis-
trust their models.
Evans and Honkapohja: What are some of the connections to learn-
ing theory?
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Sargent: There are extensive mathematical connections through the
theory of large deviations. Hansen and I exploit these. Some misspecifica-
tions are easy to learn about, others are diﬃcult to learn about. By ‘dif-
ficult’ I mean ‘learn at a slow rate’. Large deviation theory tells us which
misspecifications can be learned about quickly and which can’t. Hansen and
I restricted the amount of misspecification that our agent wants to guard
against by requiring that it be a misspecification that is hard to distinguish
from his approximating model. This is how we use learning theory to make
precise what we mean by the phrase ‘the decision maker thinks his model
is a good approximation’. There is a race between a discount factor and a
learning rate. With discounting, it makes sense to try to be robust against
plausible alternatives that are diﬃcult to learn about.
Evans and Honkapohja: Can this model of decision making be recast
in Bayesian terms?
Sargent: It depends on your perspective. We have shown that ex post ,
it can, in the sense that you can come up with a prior, a distorted model,
that rationalizes the decision maker’s choices. But ex ante you can’t — the set
of misspecifications that the agent fears is too big and he will not or cannot
tell you a prior over that set.
By the way, Lars and I have constructed equilibria with heterogeneous
agents in which the ex post Bayesian analysis implies that agents with dif-
ferent interests will have diﬀerent ‘twisted models’. From the point of view
of a rational expectations econometrician, these agents look as if they have
diﬀerent beliefs. This is a disciplined way of modelling belief heterogeneity.
Evans and Honkapohja: Is this a type of behavioral economics or
bounded rationality?
Sargent: Any decision theory is a type of behavioral economics. It is
not a type of bounded rationality. The decision maker is actually smarter
than a rational expectations agent because his fear of model misspecification
is out in the open.
Evans and Honkapohja: Parts of your description of robustness
remind us of calibration? Are there connections?
Sargent: I believe there are, but they are yet to be fully exploited.
Robust versions of dynamic estimation problems have been formulated. In
these problems, the decision maker does not use standard maximum like-
lihood estimators for his approximating model — he distrusts his likelihood
17
function. Therefore, he distorts his likelihood function in preparing his es-
timates. This twisting is reminiscent of what some calibrators do, though
the robustness procedure is more precisely defined, in the sense that you can
answer your earlier question about ‘what question is calibration the answer
to?’
Evans and Honkapohja: Why has Sims criticized your work on
robustness?
Sargent: He thinks it is not wise to leave the Bayesian one-model
framework of Savage. He thinks that there are big dividends in terms of ease
of analysis by working hard to represent fear of model misspecifications in
ways that stay within the Bayesian framework.
However, I should say that Lars’s and my readings of Chris’s early work
on approximation of distributed lags were important inspirations for our work
on robustness. Chris authored a beautiful approximation error formula and
showed how to use it to guide the choice of appropriate data filters that
would minimize approximation errors. That beautiful practical analysis of
Chris’s had a min-max flavor and was not self-consciously Bayesian. One
version of Chris’s min-max analysis originated in a message that Chris wrote
to me about a comment in which I had argued that a rational expectations
econometrician should never use seasonally adjusted data. My argument
was very Bayesian in spirit, because I assumed that the econometrician had
the correct model. Chris both read my comment and wrote his memo on
a Minneapolis bus going home from the U in 1976 — that’s how fast Chris
is. Chris’s bus-memo on seasonality and approximation error was pretty well
known in the macro time series community at Minnesota in the late 1970s.
(At the time, I don’t know why, I felt that the fact that Chris could write
such an insightful memo while riding on his twenty minute bus ride home
put me in my proper place.) By the way, in Eric Ghysels’s 1993 Journal of
Econometrics special volume on seasonality, Lars and I wrote a paper that
went a long way towards accepting Sims’s bus memo argument. That Ghysels
volume paper was one motivation for our robustness research agenda.
Minnesota economics
Evans and Honkapohja: Along with Carnegie-Mellon and Chicago,
Minnesota during the 1970s was at the forefront in developing and propagat-
ing a new dynamic macroeconomics. What ingredients formed the Minnesota
environment?
18
Sargent: Tension and tolerance. We took strong positions and had im-
mense disagreements. But the rules of engagement were civil and we always
built each other up to our students. Minnesota in those days had a remark-
able faculty. (It still does!) The mature department leaders Leo Hurwicz
and John Chipman set the tone: they advocated taking your time to learn
carefully and they encouraged students to learn math. Chris Sims and Neil
Wallace were my two best colleagues. Both were forever generous with ideas,
always extremely critical, but never destructive. The three of us had strong
disagreements but there was also immense respect. Our seminars were excit-
ing. I interacted intensively with both Neil and Chris through dissertations
committees.
The best thing about Minnesota from the mid 70s to mid 80s was our ex-
traordinary students. These were mostly people who weren’t admitted into
top 5 schools. Students taking my macro and time series classes included
John Geweke, Gary Skoog, Salih Neftci, George Tauchen, Michael Salemi,
Lars Hansen, Rao Aiyagari, Danny Peled, Ben Bental, Bruce Smith, Michael
Stutzer, Charles Whiteman, Robert Litterman, Zvi Eckstein, Marty Eichen-
baum, Yochanan Shachmurove, Rusdu Saracoglu, Larry Christiano, Ran-
dall Wright, Richard Rogerson, Gary Hansen, Selahattin Imrohoroglu, Ayse
Imrohoroglu, Fabio Canova, Beth Ingram, Bong Soo Lee, Albert Marcet,
Rodolfo Manuelli, Hugo Hopenhayn, Lars Ljungqvist, Rosa Matzkin, Victor
Rios Rull, Gerhard Glomm, Ann Vilamil, Stacey Schreft, Andreas Hornstein,
and a number of others. What a group! A who’s-who of modern macro and
macroeconometrics. Even a governor of a central bank (Rusdu Saracoglu)! If
these weren’t enough, after I visited Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1981-82,
Patrick Kehoe, Danny Quah, Paul Richardson, and Richard Clarida each
came to Minneapolis for much of the summer of 1982, and Danny and Pat
stayed longer as RAs. It was a thrill teaching classes to such students. Often
I knew less than the students I was ‘teaching’. Our philosophy at Minnesota
was that we teachers were just more experienced students.
One of the best things I did at Minnesota was to campaign for us to make
an oﬀer to Ed Prescott. He came in the early 1980s and made Minnesota
even better.
Evans and Honkapohja: You make 1970s-1980s Minnesota sound
like a love-in among Sims and Wallace and you. How do you square that
attitude with the dismal view of your work expressed in Neil Wallace’s JME
review of your Princeton book on the history of small change with François
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Velde? Do friends write about each other that way?
Sargent: Friends do talk to each other that way. Neil thinks that cash-
in-advance models are useless and gets ill every time he sees a cash-in-advance
constraint. For Neil, what could be worse than a model with a cash-in-
advance constraint? A model with two cash-in-advance constraints. But that
is what Velde and I have! The occasionally positive multiplier on that second
cash-in-advance constraint is Velde and my tool for understanding recurrent
shortages of small change and upward drifting prices of large denomination
coins in terms of small denomination ones.
When I think of Neil, one word comes to mind: integrity. Neil’s evaluation
of my book with Velde was no worse than his evaluation of the papers that
he and I wrote together. Except for our paper on commodity money, not our
best in my opinion, Neil asked me to remove his name from every paper that
he and I wrote together.
Evans and Honkapohja: Was he being generous?
Sargent: I don’t think so. He thought the papers should not be
published. After he read the introduction to one of our JPE papers, Bob
Lucas told me that no referee could possibly say anything more derogatory
about our paper than what we had written about it ourselves. Neil wrote
those critical words.
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